[ SECRET POST #4478 ]

[case]

⌈ Secret Post #4478 ⌋

Warning: Some secrets are NOT worksafe and may contain SPOILERS.

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Notes:

Secrets Left to Post: 01 pages, 21 secrets from Secret Submission Post #641.
Secrets Not Posted: [ 0 - broken links ], [ 0 - not!secrets ], [ 0 - not!fandom ], [ 0 - too big ], [ 0 - repeat ].
Current Secret Submissions Post: here.
Suggestions, comments, and concerns should go here.

Comments

[(Anonymous)]

Organic life is made of living cells, though. And while I'm all for animistic musings of some kind of consciousness existing in all matter, where's the line with robots? I'm willing to accept that tiny animals are alive - insects, what have you. Aren't toasters the insects of robots? Any argument that robots have "life" suggests that all electronics have life, and to talk of materials basically means everything in the universe is alive in some way. Which is fine, spiritually speaking, but a pretty useless conversation to have in actuality. To speak in effective terms, an android, like a toaster, doesn't represent any kind of life as we know it or in a way that has tangible meaning.

[(Anonymous)]

But let's set aside the question of whether it's "alive". The question I want to ask is, can an entity have subjectivity, consciousness, sapience, etc - the qualities that generally go to make up personhood - even if that entity is not an organic life form?

And I see no reason, in principle, why that couldn't be the case. I'm not saying any actually existing machine has those qualities, but there's no fundamental philosophical reason a sufficiently advanced machine wouldn't be capable of having them.